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La suposición de que el Tractatus de Wittgenstein propone una cierta metafísica ha 
dado lugar a una controversia sobre el estatus ontológico de los objetos tractarianos. Se ha 
debatido, por ejemplo, si estos objetos consisten sólo en particulares o tanto en particula-
res como en universales; si son entidades físicas, fenoménicas o fenomenológicas; y si co-
rresponden a los objetos de conocimiento directo de Russell o a los fenómenos y la 
sustancia de Kant. En este ensayo, apoyo la opinión de Ishiguro de que estos objetos, al 
ser conceptos formales, son ontológicamente neutrales y, por lo tanto, que no son identi-
ficables con ningún tipo ontológico de entidades. Desarrollaré la coherencia de este pun-
to de vista centrándome en la dependencia proposicional del significado de los nombres 
tractarianos. Después de mostrar por qué algunos argumentos en favor de atribuir una 
teoría russelliana del significado a estos nombres no funcionan, muestro por qué la expli-
cación de Ishiguro de los objetos y nombres tractarianos proporciona una mejor explica-
ción de la inalterabilidad de estos objetos. 
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ABSTRACT 
The supposition that Wittgenstein s Tractatus advances a certain metaphysics has 
given rise to a controversy over the ontological status of his Tractarian objects. It has been 
debated, for instance, whether these objects consist only of particulars or of both particu-
lars and universals; whether they are physical, phenomenal, or phenomenological entities; 
and whether they correspond to Russell s objects of acquaintance or Kant s phenomena 
and substance. In this essay, I endorse Ishiguro s view that these objects, being formal 
concepts, are ontologically neutral and thus are not identifiable with any ontological kind 
of entities. I elaborate on the coherence of this view with the propositional dependence 
of the meaning of Tractarian names. After showing why some arguments for ascribing a 
Russellian theory of meaning to these names do not work, I demonstrate why Ishiguro s ac-
count of Tractarian objects and names provides a better explanation of the unalterability of 
these objects. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The supposition that Wittgenstein, in his Tractatus [1974, hence-
forth also TLP ], advances a certain metaphysics or systematic ontolo-
gy  [García Suarez (2014), p. 30] has given rise to a question about the 
nature of the basic entities, the Tractarian objects, that make up this alleged 
metaphysics. We can distinguish between two major views on this ques-
tion: the ontology-specific view, which claims that these objects have a specific 
ontological status; and the ontology-neutral view, which claims otherwise.  
Proponents of the ontology-specific view, however, disagree on the 
specific ontological status of the objects. Mainly, they disagree on whether 
these objects consist of particulars only [Copi (1996); Anscombe (1967); 
Griffin (1997)] or of both particulars and universals [Allaire (1966); Hacker 
(1972); Hintikka and Hintikka (1986)]; whether they are physical, phenom-
enal, or phenomenological entities [see discussions of García Suarez (2014) 
and Tejedor (2001)]; and whether they correspond to Russell s objects of 
acquiantance [the logical positivists  see Griffin (1997) pp. 4-5; Hintikka 
and Hintikka (1986)] or to Kant s phenomena [Pears (1987), vol.1] or sub-
stance [Proops (2004)]. The ontology-neutral view, on the other hand, fol-
lows the formal view developed by Ishiguro (1969), (1981), (1989a), (1989b) 
and supported in various ways by other scholars that included McGuiness 
(1974), (1981) and Winch (1987) [See Tejedor (2001), p. 286]. According 
to this view, the concept of a Tractarian object is a formal one which is de-
finable solely in terms of the object s formal properties (referring to the 
object s combinatorial possibilities). And being such, the instantiations of 
this concept can be of any ontological type. 
In this essay, I endorse Ishiguro s formal view. Among the argu-
ments used to defend this view, I focus on its coherence with a certain 
account of Wittgenstein s names in the Tractatus, according to which the 
meaning of these names is dependent on propositional contexts. After 
presenting the textual evidences for this account, I reply to some argu-
ments maintaining a Russellian account of these names. In the last sec-
tion, I show how Ishiguro s formal view, relative to other views, makes 
better sense of Wittgenstein s description of his objects as unalterable. 
 
 
II. NAMES AND PROPOSITIONAL CONTEXTS 
 
The supposition that Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, subscribes to a 
Russellian theory of meaning for his names bears significantly on how 
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the nature of Tractarian objects would be conceived. For if Wittgenstein 
did subscribe to such then his objects would be identifiable through os-
tension, which requires no propositional contexts. It would then make 
sense to inquire whether Tractarian objects correspond to Russell s ob-
jects of acquaintance or to some other types of entities that are identifia-
ble in the same way as Russell s objects of acquaintance are, which 
generally may be of the nature of being physical, phenomenal, or phe-
nomenological.  
Russell is known for his adherence to the referential theory of meaning 
with regard to his simple signs, according to which what gives meaning 
to a simple sign is the object it corresponds to. As Russell explains: All 
analysis is only possible in regard to what is complex, and it always de-
pends, in the last analysis, upon direct acquaintance with the objects 
which are the meanings of certain simple symbols  [Russell (1956), p. 
194]. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, is known for his picture theory of 
propositions in the Tractatus, according to which a proposition has a sense 
only if it pictures a possible state of affairs in reality [TLP 4.01, 4.06, 
2.203, 2.221]. Wittgenstein s elementary proposition, the simplest kind of 
proposition, consists of simple signs called names [TLP 3.202]. These 
names are correlated with the objects consisting the state of affairs the 
elementary proposition represents [TLP 3.21]. As Wittgenstein writes: 
A name means an object. The object is its meaning  [TLP 3.203]. In 
light of these considerations, it is natural to suppose that Wittgenstein s 
picture theory of propositions implies a referential theory of meaning for 
his names.  
The referential theory of meaning has been criticized by Wittgen-
stein in the Philosophical Investigations [(1953), henceforth, “Investigations” or 
PI ] through his so-called use theory of meaning, which states that the 
meaning of a word is its use in a particular linguistic setting or language-
game.  As Wittgenstein writes in the Investigations: For a large class of 
cases  though not for all  in which we employ the word meaning  it 
can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language  
[PI, sec. 43]. Contrary to the referential theory, the use theory maintains 
that a linguistic sign may still be meaningful even if it does not refer to 
any object [See PI, sec. 40].  
The conjunction of these two considerations  that (a) both Russell 
and the Early Wittgenstein (the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus) subscribe 
to a referential theory of meaning for their simple signs; and (b) the use 
theory of meaning of the Later Wittgenstein (the Wittgenstein of the In-
vestigations) rejects the referential theory of meaning  makes it natural to 
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suppose that Russell and the Early Wittgenstein share the same theory of 
meaning for their simple signs. And consequently, it is natural to sup-
pose that the presence of the use  concept in the Investigations means its 
absence in the Tractatus. 
What identifies the object to which a simple sign refers for Russell 
is our direct acquaintance with the object. And for Russell, this process, 
also called identification by ostension or ostensive definition of signs, does not re-
quire, and thus is independent of, propositional contexts. As Russell 
notes: When you are acquainted with that particular, you have full, ade-
quate, and complete understanding of the name, and no further infor-
mation is required  [Russell (1956), p. 202]. But the case is exactly the 
opposite in the Tractatus, for Wittgenstein clearly states in TLP 3.3 that 
only propositions have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition does a 
name have meaning  and in TLP 3.314 that [a]n expression has mean-
ing only in a proposition.  Thus, though the meaning of a name in the 
Tractatus is the object it refers to (as stated in TLP 3.203), a name, how-
ever, only has meaning, or only refers to an object, in the context of a propo-
sition. Given this, a Tractarian object, therefore, is not identifiable by 
means of ostension. 
Aside from Ishiguro (1969), pp. 22-23, a number of scholars consider 
TLP 3.3 as a direct echo of Frege s contextual principle, which Frege states 
as: only in a proposition have words reall  a reference  It is eno gh if 
the proposition taken as a whole has sense; it is this that confers on its 
parts also their content  [Frege (1953), sec. 60]. And consequently, these 
scholars claim that it is not only the Later Wittgenstein who subscribed 
to the Fregean contextual principle but the Early Wittgenstein as well. 
Dummett, for instance, remarks: I said briefly that Goodman s nom-
inalism sprang from his failure to understand Frege s doctrine that only 
in the context of a sentence does a name stand for anything. This remark 
of Frege s, as quoted by Wittgenstein both in the Tractatus [3.3] and in 
the Investigations [sec. 49], is probably the most important philosophical 
statement Frege e er made  [Dummett (1956), p. 491]. There are also 
the Hintakkas who write: The principle was accepted both by Frege 
( only in a proposition have words really a meaning, ); and by Wittgen-
stein ( only propositions have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition 
does a name have a meaning,  Tractatus 3.3)  [Hintikka and Hintikka 
(1986), p. 46]. 
Now, to say that it is propositional sense that identifies the refer-
ence of a name is the same as saying that what identifies the reference of 
a name is the use of this name in a propositional context. What this 
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means, precisely, is that the Tractatus also has a use  concept. And in-
deed, as Wittgenstein himself states in the Tractatus: In order to recog-
nize a symbol by its sign we must observe how it is used with a sense  
[TLP 3.326]; If a sign is useless, it is meaningless  [TLP 3.328]. Thus, just 
like in the Investigations, the use of a name identifies reference too in the 
Tractatus. The only difference between the two use  concepts, as Ishigu-
ro (1969), p. 21 points out, is that the one in the Tractatus is restricted to 
identifying reference, whereas that in the Investigations concerns a whole 
lot more. But this is only because the Tractatus is merely concerned with 
the analysis of truth-bearing expressions (the propositions ); whereas 
the Investigations is also concerned with other types of expressions like ex-
clamations, commands, questions, etc. [See PI, sec. 27]. Consequently, it 
is not that the Early Wittgenstein and Russell share a referential theory of 
meaning which the use theory of meaning of the Later Wittgenstein op-
poses, but that the Early Wittgenstein and the Later Wittgenstein share a 
use theory of meaning (inspired by the Fregean contextual principle) that 
opposes Russell s referential theory of meaning. 
 
 
III. MEANING OF NAMES: OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES 
 
Despite the occurrence of passages in the Tractatus, such as TLP 
3.3, which clearly contradict a Russellian theory of meaning for names, 
several scholars still maintain that the Tractatus does subscribe to such a 
theory by citing passages in the Tractatus or other views allegedly held by 
Wittgenstein in the Tractatus that lend support to their view. Let us, in 
what follows, critically examine several attempts in this regard.  
Pears (1987) argues that TLP 3.3 does not totally reject the view 
that Tractarian objects are identifiable independently of propositional 
contexts but only qualifies it. Pears contends that Tractarian objects are 
initially identified by ostension; and that it is only afterwards that they are 
identified by their propositional contexts. He explains:  a name ma  
first be attached to an object in something like the way envisaged by 
Russell, but thereafter it will represent the object only so long as the pos-
sibilities presented by the propositions in which it occurs are real possi-
bilities for that object  [Pears (1987), pp. 102-103]. He further claims 
that once a name is attached to an object via ostension, the intrinsic na-
ture of the object will immediately take over complete control and de-
termine the correct use of the name on later occasions  [ibid., p. 10]. He 
thinks that this must be so otherwise Wittgenstein s adherence to logical 
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realism in the Tractatus will not make sense. Pears understands this alleged 
logical realism of the Tractatus as claiming that the logical structure of 
language is derived from the structure of the world, or that logic is onto-
logically grounded. 
But how does this point of Pears cohere with Wittgenstein s rejec-
tion of Frege s and Russell s logical objects or constants [TLP 5.4: At this 
point it becomes manifest that there are no logical  objects  or logical 
constants  (in Frege s and Russell s sense). ]? On the one hand, Ishiguro 
reads this rejection as indicating Wittgenstein s total rejection of logical 
realism. She argues that Wittgenstein turns the thesis of logical realism 
upside down, in that for Wittgenstein in the Tractatus it is language that 
imposes logical structure on the world, not the other way around. She 
writes: If there is any relation between the world and logic of one mold-
ing the other, the direction seems to be the reverse. It is not the essence 
of things in the world that shapes logic, it is the logical form of the 
propositions that gives the essence of the world. To give the essence of 
the proposition means to give the essence of all description, therefore 
the essence of the world  (M  italics  5.47)  [Ishiguro (1989), p. 22]. On 
the other hand, Pears believes that what Wittgenstein is rejecting here is 
simply the Platonic brand of logical realism espoused by Frege and Russell. 
And for Pears, what Wittgenstein is advancing as an alternative is an Aris-
totelian brand of logical realism in which the logical structure of the world 
is embedded (or immanent) in the objects [Pears (1987), pp. 23, 26].  
Pears bases his claim on a certain statement in TLP 6.124 which 
states: It is clear that something about the world must be indicated by the 
fact that certain combinations of symbols  whose essence involves the 
possession of a determinate character  are tautologies.  Wittgenstein, in 
this connection, regards tautologies as by-products of the structure of 
language [TLP 6.126]; and Pears thinks this is because for Wittgenstein 
the essential structure of our language is imposed on it by the ultimate 
structure of reality, which is a grid with simple objects at its nodal 
points  [ibid., p. 28]. This reading of the putative statement in TLP 6.126, 
however, is challenged by Ishiguro:  
 
What Wittgenstein intends to say is surely quite different  This sentence 
is a continuation of a passage on which Wittgenstein claims that proposi-
tions of logic ha e no s bject matter  In other ords, there are no logi-
cal objects, logical properties, or logical structure that propositions of logic 
are about, and which can be found in the world as tables, colour or struc-
tures of machines can be. The only connection propositions of logic have 
with the world is that the former shows various scheme of elementary 
Wittgenstein s Objects and the Theory of Names in the Tractatus                   35 
teorema XL/2, 2021, pp. 29-43 
propositions linked by logical connectives that are always true, and it is 
presupposed that these elementary propositions have things in the world 
as their subject matter. Wittgenstein is saying that what these tautologies, 
i.e. propositions of logic indicate about the world can at most be only that 
[Ishiguro (1989), p. 29]. 
 
For Pears, what propositions of logic indicate about the world is that the 
world has a structure that it imposes on language and that this structure 
forces language to generate tautologies. By contrast, Ishiguro argues that 
the only connection propositions of logic have with the world is that the 
former shows various schema of elementary propositions linked by logi-
cal connectives that are always true, and that it is presupposed that these 
elementary propositions have things in the world as their subject matter. 
What makes Ishiguro s reading, in this regard, preferable is that it is 
coheres well with Wittgenstein s view of propositions of logic having no 
subject matter  likewise stated in TLP 6.124. Under Pears  interpreta-
tion, such propositions would have a subject matter: the logical structure 
that the world, which for Russell consists of the logical forms, constants, 
properties, etc. When Wittgenstein rejects the logical objects of Russell, 
it is thus more consistent to suppose that Wittgenstein likewise rejects 
the thesis of logical realism altogether, and not just a version of it. Con-
sequently, it is more logical to suppose that TLP 3.3 is a total rejection of 
the view that Tractarian objects are identifiable independently of propo-
sitional contexts, and not just a partial one. 
The Hintikkas, for their part, claim that when Wittgenstein men-
tions this  and that  in TLP 5.61, Wittgenstein is producing Russell s 
terminology almost verbatim  [Hintikka and Hintikka (1986), p. 47]. Rus-
sell considers the demonstratives this  and that  as paradigm examples 
of logically proper names, for they are uttered only in the presence of 
what they point to. If Wittgenstein uses them in the Russellian sense, 
then that will somehow indicate that he shares Russell s theory of mean-
ing for his names. TLP 5.61 states: 
 
Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits. So we 
cannot say in logic, The world has this in it, and this, but not that.  For 
that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding certain possibili-
ties, and this cannot be the case, since it would require that logic should go 
beyond the limits of the world; for only in that way could it view those 
limits from the other side as well. We cannot think what we cannot think; 
so what we cannot think we cannot say either. 
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Given the context, the words this  and that  in the second sentence 
refer to possibilities in the world, as the following third sentence consid-
ers the implication of the second sentence as excluding certain possibili-
ties.  But what is possible in the world of the Tractatus, and which logic 
deals with, is the obtaining or the non-obtaining of a state of affairs or 
combination of objects to form a state of affairs [TLP 2.012, 2.0121]. Ac-
cordingly, Wittgenstein s this  and that  do not correspond to Russell s, 
for Wittgenstein s refer to states of affairs or combinations of objects, and 
not to isolated objects such as Russell s objects of acquaintance.  
Malcolm, on the other hand, claims that what Wittgenstein meant 
in the Tractatus by knowing an object  was close to what Russell meant 
by being acquainted with an object  [Malcolm (1986), p. 10]. Malcolm is 
referring to TLP 2.0123, which states: If I know an object I also know 
all its possible occurrence in states of affairs. (Every one of these possi-
bilities must be part of the nature of the object. A new possibility cannot 
be discovered later.)  Wittgenstein speaks here of knowing an object as 
knowing all the combinatorial possibilities of the object. But Russell nev-
er speaks of being acquainted with an object  in this way. For Russell, 
each (sense-datum) particular stands entirely alone and is completely 
self-subsistent  [Russell (1956), p. 201]. If Tractarian objects cannot exist 
independently of their occurrences in states of affairs, Russellian particu-
lars can. Knowing an object  in TLP 2.0123 should be taken in the logi-
cal sense, for it is only in the province of logic where every possibility is 
accounted for [ In logic nothing is accidental: if a thing can occur in a 
state of affairs, the possibility of the state of affairs must be written into 
the thing itself.  TLP 2.012]. This is unlike Russell s knowledge by ac-
quaintance  which is obviously taken by Russell in an epistemological sense. 
As one cannot epistemologically know all the possible occurrences of 
objects in states of affairs, such knowledge can only be a logical one.  
Lastly, Anscombe reads the elucidations of names  in TLP 3.263 
as referring to acquaintance with the objects these names refer to.  Her 
reading of such enables her to accuse Wittgenstein of lying: But it is fair 
to say that at the time he wrote the Tractatus, Wittgenstein pretended that 
Epistemology had nothing to do with the foundations of logic and the 
theory of meaning, with which he was concerned. The passage about 
elucidation  of names, where he says that one must be acquainted  with 
their objects, gives him the lie  [Anscombe (1967), p. 28]. TLP 3.263 
states: The meanings of primitive signs can be explained by means of 
elucidations. Elucidations are propositions that contain the primitive 
signs. So they can only be understood if the meanings of those signs are 
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already known.  Anscombe, based on her commentary, understands the 
phrase the meanings of those signs are already known  as we have al-
ready been acquainted with the references of those signs.  Ishiguro 
(1969), pp. 28-29, and Winch (1987), pp. 10-11, however, are keen in 
pointing out that Anscombe s reading renders TLP 3.263 as totally circu-
lar and thus unilluminating. For under this reading, TLP 3.263 would 
first assert that we can only know the reference of a primitive sign by 
first understanding the proposition in which this primitive sign occurs, 
and then assert that we can only understand the proposition in which 
this primitive sign occurs by first knowing the reference of the primitive 
sign by itself  that is, outside of a propositional context.  
The alternative reading provided by Ishiguro and Winch of TLP 
3.263 regards elucidations as propositions in which names are used ra-
ther than mentioned. Accordingly, when we understand the sense of an 
elucidation, we simultaneously understand the reference of a name oc-
curring therein. TLP 3.263 thus merely emphasizes the fact that under-
standing the sense of an elucidation and knowing the reference of a 
name occurring in the elucidation are not two logically separate steps. 
Based on this, the putative phrase is better understood as we already 
know how those signs are used in propositions.  Aside from making 
TLP 3.263 non-circular, the interpretation of Ishiguro and Winch co-
heres well with TLP 3.3 ( Only in the nexus of a proposition does a 
name have meaning. ), which immediately follows TLP 3.263. Further-
more, there would be no need of accusing Wittgenstein of lying.  
 
 
IV. MEANING AND TRACTARIAN OBJECTS 
 
Given our analyses above, what then needs to be worked out is 
how to account for the nature of Tractarian objects within the parame-
ters of the use theory of meaning for names in the Tractatus. And this 
precisely is what Ishiguro has set herself to do. She writes: What 3.3 ex-
presses is a general thesis about expressions and the objects they designate, 
which plainly derives from Frege s Foundations of Arithmetic Wittgenstein s 
notion of simple objects made him take this view even more seriously. 
One cannot look for the references of Names independently of their use 
in propositions  [Ishiguro (1969), p. 22]. 
To begin with, a formal concept is definable solely by their func-
tions. Being so, their instantiations are identifiable only in the context of 
satisfying such functions. If we define, for example, a heart in terms sole-
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ly of its function of pumping blood, then something can only be a heart 
when it performs such a function. In the case of the Tractarian objects, 
their functions, which also correspond to their formal properties, refer to 
their combinatorial possibilities in constituting states of affairs. Given 
this, one cannot identify a Tractarian object independently of its occur-
rence in a state of affairs. Correspondingly, the names of objects com-
bine to form (elementary) propositions. In the same way, we can only 
identify the reference of a name in the context of a proposition, for the 
name s use in the proposition represents a function of the object it refers 
to. Suppose, for example, we say x pumps blood.  Since we know that 
the function of the heart is to pump blood, we thus know that x  is iden-
tical to heart.  What makes x  here identify the organ called heart  is 
how it is used in the proposition, which here signifies the function of the 
heart. What all these mean is that the use of a name in a proposition signi-
fies the role of an object in a state of affairs.  
When we say that a Tractarian object is a formal concept, we thus 
mean that its instantiations are definable only in terms of functional 
properties, which is basically the same as saying that the name identifies 
its reference (the instantiation) through its use in a proposition. [There 
are thus two levels of speaking of Tractarian objects: as formal concepts 
and as instantiations of these concepts.] Since this proposition is taken to 
be elementary, these properties must, therefore, be simple or irreducible. 
It is in this regard that Ishiguro likewise refers to Tractarian objects as 
instantiations of irreducible properties  [ibid., p. 48]. Furthermore, as 
what we can only be known of Tractarian objects is that they are instan-
tiations of some irreducible properties, Ishiguro likens Tractarian names 
to dummy names: What the dummy names are used to identify are noth-
ing more nor less than an instantiation of the description or predicate 
which follows  [ibid., p. 46]. But more importantly, what this means for 
Ishiguro is that it is, therefore, not proper to ask about the ontological 
type of Tractarian objects. She writes:  
 
That is why it is not right to ask questions of the kind, Is an object a 
physical thing or a sense data?  any more than to ask Is a subject of 
proposition a physical thing or a sense data?  Obviously it could be either! 
It is also as wrong to ask, Is an object a particular or a universal?  as it is 
mistaken to ask: Is a subject a particular or a universal?  Being an ob-
ject is, as 4.128 says, a formal concept, to be carefully distinguished from 
proper concepts. What kind of thing it is cannot be expressed by a (prop-
ositional) function of our (object) language. It is not a kind of thing at all 
[ibid., p. 26]. 
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Some scholars have provided analogies to better illustrate this no-
tion of the Tractarian objects. McCarty (1991), pp. 71-2, for instance, 
compares a Tractarian object to a corporate office. According to 
McCarty, a corporate office like that of an executive is definable solely in 
terms of its functions or services in relation to the corporation. It does 
not comprise a natural kind like a separate blood group or race. One dis-
tinguishes one office from another, say a secretary from an executive, 
not in terms of height, color, weight, and the like, but only in terms of 
functions. A Tractarian object is like that, explains McCarty. It does not 
comprise a natural kind like particulars, universals, sense-data, and what 
not. As nobody is intrinsically or inherently a secretary or a corporate ex-
ecutive, nothing is intrinsically a Tractarian object. As one only becomes 
a secretary upon assuming certain roles, something only becomes a Trac-
tarian object upon assuming a combinatorial role in the formation of a 
state of affairs.  
Grayling (1988), p. 49, on the other hand, likens Tractarian objects 
to chess pieces. Following McCarty s distinction between natural kinds 
and functional kinds, Grayling explains that being a chess queen, for in-
stance, is not being an entity of a natural kind but solely of a functional 
one. For a chess queen is distinguished from a chess bishop solely in 
terms of its permitted moves on the chess board. Nothing is inherently a 
chess queen for something only becomes so when it assumes the role of 
moving in some determinate ways on the chess board. Thus to debate on 
whether a chess queen is a piece of wood, glass, or plastic is to confuse 
the functional with the natural kind.  
One advantage of this understanding of the nature of Tractarian 
objects, among others, is that it makes better sense of Wittgenstein s de-
scription of such objects as being unalterable  [TLP 2.021, 2.024, 
2.024]. The unalterability of Tractarian objects, for some scholars, is de-
cisive in refuting the identification of Tractarian objects with phenome-
nal entities such as Russell s ephemeral sense-data. Malcolm, for 
instance, writes: The simple objects of the Tractatus could not include 
sense-data.  Sense-data are supposed to be fleeting : they quickly alter, 
come and go. The simple objects are not like that: they are enduring and 
unchanging (2.0271)  [Malcolm (1986), p. 10] [See also Griffin (1997), p. 
150; Ayer (1986), p. 22; and Klemke (1971), p. 117]. The Hintikkas, 
however, do not agree with Malcolm in this regard. They think that the 
unalterability of objects means their atemporality  or their not being in 
time. They write: Wittgenstein s conception of existence amounts to 
momentary or, more accurately, atemporal being. Because of their atem-
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porality, the substantiality of simple objects is not affected by the altera-
bility or even by the coming-to-be and disappearance of objects in time  
[Hintikka and Hintikka (1986), p. 69]. Given this, they claim that the 
temporal ephemerality of sense-data and of many other objects of ac-
quaintance does not disqualify them in the least from being substantial in 
Wittgenstein s sense  [ibid., p. 70].  
On the one hand, Malcolm s reading would make Tractarian ob-
jects akin to the unchanging Platonic forms, which is strange since that 
would mean that the world that the Tractatus talks about has nothing to 
do with the actual world. On the other hand, the Hintikkas s reading 
seems contradictory: that something atemporal or not being in time can 
at the same time be temporally ephemeral. Such obscure or problematic 
conclusions, however, are not necessary. Ishiguro s alternative reading 
avoids them. She explains the unalterability of Tractarian objects in 
terms of the permanent role of their names in identifying them: 
 
Reference  is a semantic category with its peculiar logic. The bearer of the 
name Socrates  no longer exists, but the name has reference. So long as 
the name plays the role of identifying the man that once existed, it will al-
ways have a reference. Just as references of names are permanent in our 
language, so according to Wittgenstein objects are unalterable and persis-
tent (bestehend) (2.0271). [Ishiguro (1969), pp. 40-41] 
 
What determines the role a name plays in identifying its reference is its 
propositional context, or the sense of the proposition in which the name 
occurs. Now so long as there are propositional contexts in our language 
where a name plays the role of identifying its reference, regardless of 
whether its bearer no longer exists, its reference  a Tractarian object –
remains unalterable. Another way of putting this is as follows: so long as 
there are propositional senses which continue to identify the reference of 
a name, the reference, which is the object, remains unalterable. The dis-
tinction between the bearer and reference of a name clarifies it further. 
Take, for instance, the proposition Socrates was the teacher of Plato.  
The sense of this proposition has it that the reference of Socrates  is 
the man that once existed. Despite the fact that Socrates  no longer has 
a bearer  for the man named by Socrates  no longer exists  it still has 
a reference, for the sense of this proposition Socrates was the teacher 
of Plato  continues to identify the man who once existed.  
Remarkably, this is precisely how Wittgenstein later speaks of his 
Tractarian objects in the Philosophical Remarks: What I once called ob-
jects , simples, were simply what I could refer to without running the risk 
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of their possible non-existence; i.e. that for which there is neither existence 
nor non-existence, and that means: what we can speak about no matter what 
may be the case” [Wittgenstein (1975), p. 72]. What we speak about is the ref-
erence of what we speak about. No matter what may be the case, that is, 
whether what we speak about exists or not, it (the reference) continuous to 





In sum, Ishiguro s formal view that Tractarian objects are formal 
concepts or instantiations of irreducible properties proves to be more 
coherent than those ascribing a definite metaphysical status to these ob-
jects on the basis of its ability to account for the fact that that the mean-
ings of their names are proposition-dependent. As formal concepts are 
definable solely in terms of their functions, Tractarian objects are only 
identifiable in terms of the uses of their names in propositions. The uses 
of their names, accordingly, represent their combinatorial possibilities, 
which comprise their formal properties. As names occur in elementary 
propositions, the instantiations of Tractarian objects are also described 
as instantiations of irreducible properties. This account of the nature of 
Tractarian objects in terms of the meaning of their names has the further 
advantage of making sense of Wittgenstein s description of the objects as 
unalterable.  Instead of explaining it in ontological terms, either as be-
yond change or time, Ishiguro explains it in purely semantic terms that 
objects remain as references of names so long as there are propositional 
contexts that identify these objects as references of these names. 
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